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UNITED STATES v. SANTEE SIOUX TRIBE OF NEBRASKA:
THE FUTURE OF IGRA AND INDIAN GAMING
IN JEOPARDY
I. INTRODUCrION
During the modern history of North America, white European
settlers destroyed the self-sufficiency of Native American Indians
("Indians") through war, disease and deceptive treaties. After many
years of economic disarray, some Indians attempted to regain self-
sufficiency by commercial exploitation of a practice that was tradi-
tional in many Indian nations-gambling.1 Recently, casinos lo-
cated on Indian reservations have become the fastest growing
segment of the American gaming industry.2 In 1993 alone, reserva-
tion gambling yielded $5.4 billion in revenue. 3 Predictably, the fed-
eral government passed legislation to regulate the lucrative
business of Indian gaming.4
Today, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) 5 dictates
that gaming on tribal lands is subject to state laws. 6 Although Con-
1. See Brad Jolly, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: The Unwavering Policy of
Termination Continues, 29 ARiz. ST. L.J. 273, 274 (1997) (discussing historical "hoop
and arrow" game as example of early tribal gambling).
2. Michael D. Cox, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: An Overview, 7 ST.
THOmAs L. Rev. 769 (1995).
3. SeeJeffery B. Mallory, Congress's Authority to AbrogateA State's Eleventh Amend-
ment Immunity from Suit: Will Seminole Tribe v. Florida Be Seminal, 7 ST. THOMAS L.
REv. 791, 792 (1995).
4. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 2, at 769. In 1979, the Seminole Tribe of Florida
opened a high-stakes bingo parlor in violation of Florida gambling laws. See id. In
order to continue its operation, the tribe brought suit and prevailed in the District
Court for the Southern District of Florida. See id.; see also Seminole Tribe of Florida
v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310, 316 (5th Cir. 1981) (affirming district court's ruling
that Florida gambling laws could not be enforced against tribe).
5. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1168 (1994).
6. See 18 U.S.C. § 1166. Section 1166(a) entitled "Gambling in Indian coun-
try," provides, in pertinent part:
Subject to subsection (c), for purposes of Federal law, all State laws per-
taining to the licensing, regulation, or prohibition of gambling, including
but not limited to criminal sanctions applicable thereto, shall apply in
Indian country in the same manner and to the same extent as such laws
apply elsewhere in the State.
Id. Subsection (c) reads as follows:
For the purpose of this section, the term "gambling" does not include -
(1) class I gaming or class III gaming regulated by the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act, or (2) class III gaming conducted under a Tribal-State
compact approved by the Secretary of the Interior under Section
11 (d) (8) of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act that is in effect.
(325)
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gress' stated intent was to protect and promote gambling on Indian
reservations, IGRA, in effect, has limited tribal sovereignty. 7
A recent Eighth Circuit case, United States v. Santee Sioux Tribe of
Nebraska,8 illustrates how the IGRA has limited tribal sovereignty.
In Santee, the Eighth Circuit held that the United States Attorney
General had the authority to seek injunctive relief against Indian
gambling facilities operating in violation of a closure order.9 The
court reached this conclusion without citing express authorization
in IGRA, and in spite of that fact that the statute included enforce-
ment mechanisms. 10 Additionally, the court held that states that
prohibited gambling were not required to negotiate with a Tribe
seeking to open a casino in that State.11
This Note examines the Santee court's holding and rationale, as
well as the implications for the future of gambling on Indian reser-
vations. Section II details the facts of Santee.12 Part III provides
background information on government attempts to regulate gam-
ing on Indian lands, including a discussion of the impact of the
Id. at § 1166(c).
7. SeeJolly, supra note 1, at 301-06; see also 25 U.S.C. §2702, entitled "Declara-
tion of policy," which states:
The purpose of this chapter is -
(1) to provide for a statutory basis for the regulation of gaming by Indian
tribes a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-suffi-
ciency, and strong tribal governments;
(2) to provide a statutory basis for the regulation of gaming by an Indian
tribe adequate to shield it from organized crime and other corrupting
influences, to ensure that the Indian tribe is the prime beneficiary of the
gaming operation, and to assure that gaming is conducted fairly and hon-
estly by both the operator and players; and
(3) to declare that the establishment of independent Federal authority
for gaming on Indian lands, the establishment of Federal standards for
gaming on Indian lands, and the establishment of a National Indian
Gaming Commission are necessary to meet congressional concerns re-
garding gaming and to protect such gaming as a means of generating
tribal revenue.
Id.
8. 135 F.3d 558 (8th Cir. 1998).
9. See id. at 566 (reversing district court's order and remanding for entry of
order enjoining Tribe's operation of class III gaming and enforcing closure or-
der). For a complete discussion of the facts of Santee, see infra notes 17-29 and
accompanying text.
10. See generally United States v. Santee Sioux tribe of Nebraska, 135 F.3d 558
(8th Cir. 1998).
11. See id. at 565 (citing Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d
273, 279 (8th Cir. 1993)) (relying on "such gaming" language of 25 U.S.C. § 2710
(d) (1)(B)); see also Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. Green, 995 F.2d 179,
181 (10th Cir. 1993) (also relying on 25 U.S.C. § 2710).
12. For a full discussion of the facts and procedural history of this case, see
infra notes 16-28 and accompanying text.
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IGRA and the litigation which followed its enactment. 13 Next, this
Note explains the Eighth Circuit's rationale for its ruling in San-
tee.14 Part V analyzes the court's reasoning, providing a critique
based on prior holdings and additional authorities.15 Finally, this
Note examines the likely consequences of the Eighth Circuit's
holding.1 6
II. FACTS
In March 1993, the Santee Sioux Tribe of Nebraska sought the
tribal-state compact necessary under IGRA to conduct class III gam-
ing on its reservation. 17 During negotiations, the Tribe and the
State of Nebraska failed to come to terms.18 The Tribe, neverthe-
less, opened a gaming facility which offered video slot machines,
video poker and video blackjack. 19 On April 25, 1996 the Chair-
man of the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC) issued an
order of temporary closure. 20 In compliance, the Tribe closed its
gaming facility on May 5.21 It reopened the facility, however, on
13. For an overview of Congress' attempts to regulate Indian gambling and
the judicial interpretation of such regulation, see infra notes 29-67 and accompany-
ing text.
14. For a comprehensive discussion of the Eighth Circuit's reasoning in San-
tee, see infra notes 68-97 and accompanying text.
15. For a complete analysis of the Santee decision, see infra notes 98-147 and
accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the impact on Indian gambling, see infra note 148 and
accompanying text.
17. See United States v. Santee Sioux Tribe of Nebraska, 135 F.3d 558, 560
(8th Cir. 1998); see also 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6)-(8) (describing class I gaming as "social
games solely for prizes of minimal value or traditional forms of Indian gaming;"
describing class II gaming as "(i) the game of chance commonly known as bingo
... (ii) card games that - (I) are explicitly authorized by the laws of the State, or
(II) are not explicitly prohibited by the laws of the State and are played at any
location in the State . . ." and describing class III gaming as "all forms of gaming
that are not class I gaming or class II gaming").
18. See Santee, 135 F.3d at 560. The State extended negotiations in an attempt
to reach an agreement. See id.; see also 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (3) (A) (requiring State
to negotiate in "good faith" with tribe).
19. See Santee, 135 F.3d at 560. The Tribe then brought suit against the State
and its governor for failure to negotiate in good faith. See id. For a discussion of
"good faith" requirement, see supra note 11. The State asserted its Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity and counter- claimed, alleging violation of the
IGRA's prohibition of class III gaming without the State's permission. See id. The
court denied the State's motion for a temporary restraining order against the
Tribe's gaming activities, and dismissed the Tribe's suit against the state based on
the State's sovereign immunity. See id.
20. See id. at 561. For a discussion of class III gaming, see supra note 10.
21. See Santee, 135 F.3d at 561. The Tribe appealed the Chairman's order to
the full Commission and the district court, claiming that the compacting provi-
sions of the IGRA were unconstitutional and that Nebraska permits class III gam-
ing. See id.
3
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June 28.22 On July 31, the NIGC upheld the Chairman's order on
appeal, making it a final agency action.23
On appeal by the Tribe, the Eighth Circuit addressed the issues
of whether IGRA enabled the Attorney General to enforce the
NIGC's closure orders and, if so, whether the Attorney General had
the authority to seek injunctive relief to that end. 24 Additionally,
the Tribe questioned the government's power to enjoin illegal activ-
ity.25 Finally, the Tribe argued that the Supreme Court's ruling in
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. F/orida26 made IGRA's provisions relating
to compacting unconstitutional. 2 7 The court held that the Attorney
General had the authority to enforce the NIGC's orders and that
the IGRA provided injunctions as enforcement mechanisms of clo-
sure orders.28 Further, the court upheld the government's use of
an injunction to enjoin illegal gambling based on Nebraska case
law.29 Finally, the court declined to address the constitutionality of
IGRA's compacting provisions, stating that Nebraska is not required
to negotiate for gambling that is illegal under State law.30
III. BACKGROUND
This section traces the history of the government regulation of
gaming on Indian reservations. Specifically, the section includes a
22. See id. The Tribe decided to continue its operation while they awaited the
District Court's ruling. See id. On July 2, 1996, the United States filed a complaint
against the Tribe seeking to enforce the chairman's order and enjoining the con-
tinued operation of a class III gaming facility without a valid tribal-state compact.
See id. The district court consolidated the Tribe's and the State's lawsuits and on
July 7, dismissed the Tribe's case, holding that the chairman's temporary closure
was not a final agency action subject to judicial review. See Santee, 135 F.3d at 561.
Likewise, the court dismissed the State's case, holding that United States was not
entitled to a civil injunction enforcing the Chairman's order and that injunctions
cannot be used to enjoin illegal activities. See id.
23. See id Subsequently, the United States sought leave of the district court to
file a supplemental pleading based on the NIGC's final order. See id. The court
denied the motion finding that the IGRA only empowered the government to pur-
sue criminal actions and not to seek civil injunctions to enforce the NIGC's orders.
See id.
24. See Santee, 135 F.3d at 561-63. The Government asserted that the Attorney
General and the United States Attorneys enjoined broad authority to litigate under
28 U.S.C. § 516. See id. at 561.
25. See id. at 563-65. The Tribe's argument was in direct opposition to the
government's assertion of power pursuant to § 516. See id. at 562.
26. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
27. See Santee, 135 F.3d at 565. For the Supreme Court's holding in Seminole,
see infra note 54.
28. See Santee, 135 F.3d at 562-63.
29. See id. at 565.
30. See id. at 565.
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description of pre-IGRA legislation, an examination of IGRA and
subsequent case law, and a discussion of the Attorney General's role
in enforcing IGRA.
A. Public Law 280
In the early 1950s, concern about poor conditions on Indian
reservations led Congress to pass legislation that transferred author-
ity from the tribes to the states in which reservations were located.31
To this end, Congress enacted Public Law 280.32 The exact scope
of the states' jurisdiction over Indian affairs was unclear until the
Supreme Court decided Bryan v. Itasca County.3 3 In Bryan, the
Court concluded that Public Law 280 granted the states complete
criminal jurisdiction over Indian reservations, but did not confer
civil regulatory jurisdiction. 34 As a result of the Bryan decision, the
federal government changed its policy toward the tribes, allowing
them to regulate themselves without state interference.3 5
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of a state's right to
regulate gambling on Indian lands under Public Law 280 in Califor-
nia v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.36 The Court used the reason-
ing from Bryan to determine that, because California allowed some
forms of gambling in the state, it could not prohibit Indians from
using the same forms of gambling on their reservations.3 7 This
31. See H.R. Rep. No. 848, at 5-6 (1950). Specifically, Congress saw "a hiatus
in law-enforcement authority that could be best remedied by conferring criminal
jurisdiction on States indicating an ability and willingness to accept such responsi-
bility." Id.
32. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1994) (criminal jurisdiction); 18 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994)
(civil jurisdiction).
33. 426 U.S. 373 (1976). The case involved an attempt by the State of Minne-
sota to levy personal property taxes on an Indian mobile home located on trust
land. See id. at 373.
34. See id. at 390.
35. See Keith David Bilezerian, Ante Up or Fold: States Attempt to Play their Hand
While Indian Casinos Cash In, 29 NEW ENG. L. REV. 463, 468 (Winter 1995) (noting
evolution of Congressional policy on governing Indian affairs from pre-1887 to
post-1968).
36. 480 U.S. 202 (1987). The case revolved around the tribe's operation of
high stakes bingo games on its reservation in violation of California Penal Code
§ 626.5, which only permits bingo games operated by charitable organizations with
prizes not exceeding $250 per game. See id. at 250.
37. See id. at 210. The test is whether the state law generally prohibits certain
conduct, thereby falling under Public Law 280's grant of criminal jurisdiction, or
whether the state generally allows the conduct, subject to regulation, whereby it is
a civil regulatory law and outside the scope of Public Law 280. See id. at 209.
5
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holding ushered in a new era of gambling on Indian reservations,
which could be limited only by Congressional legislation. 38
B. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988
The Congressional response to Cabazon came in the form of
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988. 39 States and non-In-
dian gambling interests lobbied Congress for regulation to prevent
organized crime involvement in Indian reservation gaming facili-
ties.4° Some members of Congress, however, questioned the mo-
tives of the lobbying parties.41 Nevertheless, both the House and
Senate passed IGRA without difficulty.42
1. General Provisions of IGRA
Congress stated that it designed IGRA to protect and promote
tribal economic interests. 43 To accomplish this goal, IGRA defines
three classes of "gaming."44 First, Class III gaming includes the
high stakes casino-type games such as roulette, craps and keno.45
Second, IGRA established a National Indian Gaming Commission
(NIGC) within the Department of the Interior to help with the ad-
ministration of tribal gaming.46 The Chairman of the NIGC is re-
sponsible for issuing temporary closure orders, approving tribal
ordinances regulating class III gaming, and collecting civil fines.
47
38. See Bilezarian, supra note 28, at 469 (referring to report filed after 1993
Conference of Western Attorneys General that noted Indian reliance on gambling
as major source of revenue).
39. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1168 (1994).
40. See The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: Hearing Before the House Com-
mittee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 100th Cong. 167 (1987).
41. See id. Senator John McCain of Arizona stated, "the real reason that the
non-Indian gaming industry [and the States are] . . .pushing so hard for State
jurisdiction over Class III games... [is] fear of economic competition." Id. at 165.
Representative Morris K. Udall of Arizona added, that "the non-Indian gaming
industry [is] ... more insistent on State regulation of Indian gaming" than anyone
else. Id. at 109.
42. See Martha Angle, High Stakes Bingo to Continue: Congress Clears Legislation
to Regulate Indian Gambling, 46 CONG. Q. WKLY. RE'. 2730, 2730 (1988).
43. See 25 U.S.C. § 2702. For the full text of § 2702, see supra note 7.
44. Id. § 2703(6)-(8). For a discussion of the three classes, see supra note 17.
45. See 25 U.S.C. § 2703(8); see also 25 C.F.R. § 502.4(a) (2).
46. See 25 U.S.C. § 2704. The Commission is composed of three full-time
members: a Chairman, appointed by the president, and two associate members,
appointed by the Secretary of the Interior. See id.
47. See id. § 2705. The Chairman's decisions are subject to appeal to the
Commission. See id. Besides hearing appeals to the Chairman's rulings, the Com-
mission can make the chairman's temporary closure order permanent. See id
§ 2706. The Commission has the power "by an affirmative vote of not less than two
members and after a full hearing, to make permanent a temporary order of the
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Third, IGRA established civil penalties that the Chairman may pre-
scribe in the event of violations.48 Fourth, IGRA describes the pro-
cess by which a tribe can establish a class III gaming facility.49 This
provision presents the most controversial aspect of IGRA by requir-
ing states to negotiate in good faith with Indian tribes that are inter-
ested in opening class III gaming facilities. 50
2. Case Law Behind IGRA
Soon after IGRA was enacted, tribes challenged the statute on
constitutional grounds. In Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v.
Swimmer,51 the District of Columbia District Court dismissed such a
constitutional challenge, based on its holding that Congress merely
exercised its plenary power over Indian affairs when in enacted
Chairman closing a gaming activity as provided in section 2713(b) (2) of this title."
Id.
48. See id. § 2713. This section requires the Commission to provide possible
tribal violators with a written complaint stating the acts or omissions which may
form the basis of a fine or closure order. See id. § 2713(a)(3). Additionally, it
grants the Chairman the "power to order temporary closure of an Indian game."
Id. § 2713(b) (1). It also gives the tribe the "right to a hearing before the Commis-
sion to determine whether such order should be made permanent or dissolved."
Id. § 2713(b)(2). Finally, it makes the Commission's final decision "appealable to
the appropriate Federal district court pursuant to chapter 7 of title 5." Id.
§ 2713(c).
49. See id. § 2710(d)(1)-(7). The section dealing with Tribal-State compacts
states in pertinent part:
Any Indian tribe having jurisdiction over the Indian lands upon which
class III gaming activity is being conducted, or is to be conducted, shall
request that State in which such lands are located to enter into negotia-
tions for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact governing
the conduct of gaming activities. Upon receiving such a request, the
State shall negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith to enter into such
a compact.
Id. § 2710(d) (3) (A). "Any State and any Indian tribe may enter into a Tribal-State
compact governing gaming activities on the Indian lands of the Indian tribe...."
Id. § 2710(d) (3) (B).
The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction over -
Indian tribe arising from the failure of a State to enter into negotiations
with the Indian tribe for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-State com-
pact under paragraph (3)or to conduct such negotiations in good faith
(ii) any cause of action initiated by a State or Indian tribe to enjoin class
III gaming activity located on Indian lands and conducted in violation of
any Tribal-State compact entered into under paragraph (3) that is in ef-
fect, and
(iii) any cause of action initiated by the Secretary to enforce the proce-
dures proscribed under subparagraph (B) (vii).
Id. § 2710(d) (7) (A).
50. See id.
51. 740 F. Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 1990). The tribe claimed the act violated their
rights to self-determination and self-government as guaranteed by treaties and the
federal government's trust responsibility. See id. at 11.
7
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IGRA.52 In addition, the court found no violation of the trust re-
sponsibility because Congress acted to "protect tribes and the gam-
bling public from unscrupulous persons."53
States have also challenged the constitutionality of the IGRA
on Tenth and Eleventh Amendment grounds.54 In Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota,55 the Eighth Circuit stated that the IGRA
does not violate the Tenth Amendment because it does not require
states to compact with tribes regarding Indian gaming.56 In Semi-
nole Tribe v. Florida,57 the Supreme Court found that the IGRA vio-
lated a State's right to immunity from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment. 58
3. The Aftermath of Seminole
The Court's decision in Seminole has left Indian tribes, and
IGRA itself, in a precarious situation. 59 Seminole may sever tribal-
52. See id. at 11-12.
53. Id. at 13 (quoting S. Rep. NO. 100-446, at 1-2 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071).
54. The Tenth Amendment states, "[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively." U.S. CONST. amend. X. States claim that the IGRA violates the
amendment by requiring them to negotiate tribal compacts. See Edward P. Sulli-
van, Reshuffling the Deck: Proposed Amendments to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 45
SYRACUSE L. REv. 1107, 1130 (1995).
The Eleventh Amendment states, "[the judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prose-
cuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens
or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. States assert the amend-
ment's grant of immunity from suit in cases brought by Tribes against States for
failing to negotiate in good faith under IGRA. SeeJolly, supra note 1, at 311.
55. 3 F.3d 273 (8th Cir. 1993).
56. See id. at 281. The court listed a state's alternatives when a tribe brings suit
against the state; they included: 1) continue negotiations until a compact is
agreed upon; 2) negotiate, but fail to agree upon a compact, and have a court
determine if the state negotiated in good faith; and 3) refuse to negotiate and
allow a court to require a compact be concluded in sixty days. See id.
In support of its holding, the Supreme Court cited New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144 (1992). In New York, the Court held that Congress cannot "com-
mandee [r] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to
enact and enforce a federal regulatory program." Id. at 161.
57. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
58. See id. at 72-73. In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, the Tribe brought suit
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida against Flor-
ida under the IGRA to compel negotiations of a gaming compact. See id. The
Court stated, "[t] he Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Arti-
cle III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations
placed upon federal jurisdiction." Id.
59. SeeJolly, supra note 1, at 318 (expressing concern over cases where States
refuse to negotiate with Tribes and in future event of renewal of pre-existing Tri-
bal-State compacts).
[Vol. 6: p. 325
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state compacting provisions from the rest of the IGRA.60 If so,
courts could decide to return to the Cabazon "regulatory/ prohibi-
tory" test, in cases involving state regulation of class III gaming.61
Two courts have subsequently addressed the ambiguities of the
Seminole decision. First, the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. The Spo-
kane Tribe of Indians,62 concluded that, after Seminole, a violation of
class III gaming regulations cannot form the basis for an injunc-
tion.63 Second, in Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. Wilson,64 a California
district court held that the United States government had a
"mandatory duty" to prosecute a State on behalf of the Tribe for
the State's failure to negotiate in good faith.65 As these cases reveal,
the present condition of the IGRA has been undermined.
4. The Attorney General's Right to Litigate Under IGRA
IGRA grants the Attorney General the exclusive right to prose-
cute criminal violations of State gaming laws. 66 IGRA also autho-
rizes the Attorney General to investigate activities associated with
gaming which may be in violation of Federal law.67 These provi-
sions deal solely with criminal prosecutions. If the Attorney Gen-
eral can maintain civil actions, that authority must be found outside
the provisions of IGRA.
60. See Sullivan, supra note 45, at 1137 (stating that courts may determine that
Congress would have enacted IGRA without such provisions, thereby allowing that
section be removed).
61. See Sullivan, supra note 45, at 1137. For a further discussion of the Cabazon
test, see supra note 355, and accompanying text.
62. 139 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1998).
63. See id. at 1301. The Ninth Circuit expressed its concern with removing a
Tribe's right to bring suit against uncooperative States. See id. It viewed that provi-
sion of IGRA as an important device in maintaining an equal balance of power
between the Tribe and the State. See id. at 1300. The court, however, did not state
whether the surviving portion of IGRA was still valid. See id. The court stated,
"[w]e deal here only with the narrow question presented by this appeal: Is a pre-
liminary injunction authorized in these circumstances?" Id. at 1301.
64. 987 F. Supp. 804 (N.D. Cal. 1997)
65. See id. at 809. The court concluded that 25 U.S.C. § 175 created a fiduci-
ary relationship between the government and the Tribe. See id. at 807. Section' 175
states: "[i]n all States and Territories where there are reservations or allotted Indi-
ans the United States attorney shall represent them in all suits at law and in eq-
uity." Id.
66. See 18 U.S.C. § 1166(d). A valid Tribal-State compact may shift this right
to the States. See id.
67. See 25 U.S.C. § 2716 (c). Additionally, IGRA requires the Commission to
provide the Attorney General with information violations of Federal law. See id.
§ 2716(b).
9
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One possibility for such authority is the congressional grant of
plenary power in cases where the United States has an interest.68
Courts have disagreed, however, on the scope of the Attorney Gen-
eral's authority under this doctrine.69 Furthermore, courts have
held that, under this rule, the Attorney General may seek remedies
that are not expressly provided in the statute.70 Finally, some courts
have viewed the statute as a whole to determine if the Attorney Gen-
eral can file SUit. 7 1
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In United States v. Santee Sioux Tribe of Nebraska,72 the Eighth
Circuit addressed four issues concerning IGRA. Several of the
court's rulings were unprecedented in IGRA litigation. These is-
sues included the following: (1) whether the United States, acting
through the Attorney General, was entitled to maintain a closure
order issued by the NIGC; (2) whether IGRA entitled the govern-
ment to seek criminal prosecution of the Chairman's orders, or
whether civil injunctive relief was also available; (3) whether the
court may enjoin the commission of a crime; and (4) whether all of
IGRA's provisions relating to tribal-state compacts were unconsti-
tutional. 73
68. See 28 U.S.C. § 516. Section 516, titled "Conduct of litigation reserved to
Department of Justice," states:
[e]xcept as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation in
which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is
interested, and securing evidence therefore, is reserved to officers of the
Department of Justice, under the discretion of the Attorney General.
Id.
69. Compare United States v. Solomon, 563 F.2d 1121, 1121 (5th Cir. 1977)
(holding Attorney General could not assert Constitutional rights of mentally re-
tarded under Section 516, even though government interest existed, because no
explicit or implicit authority) with United States v. Hercules, Inc., 961 F.2d 796,
796 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding Attorney General could enter into consent decrees in
absence of statutory right to do so).
70. See United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 482 (1960) (hold-
ing Attorney General may seek injunction although not specifically provided for in
statute).
71. See United States v. Pima County Community College District, 409 F.
Supp. 1061, 1061 (D.Ariz. 1976) (holding statutory scheme set out by Congress
precluded Attorney General's right to file suit); United States v. St. Regis Paper
Co., 335 F.2d 688, 688 (2d Cir. 1966) (holding Federal Trade Commission Act
vested right to enforce cease and desist orders in FTC).
72. 135 F.3d 558 (8th Cir. 1998).
73. See id. at 561-65.
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A. Standing of the United States to Litigate
Before considering the merits of the case, the court initially
had to decide whether the United States, acting through the Attor-
ney General, was the proper party in the litigation.74 The court first
noted that IGRA authorized the NIGC to issue permanent closure
orders.75 The court further determined that IGRA granted neither
the NIGC or the Chairman the "independent authority to litigate
the agency's decision," nor "specifically addressed the Attorney
General's authority to institute judicial proceeding on behalf of the
Chairman or the NIGC to enforce closure orders."76 Based on
IGRA's silence on the issue, the court determined that Congress
intended the Attorney General to enforce the agency's orders.77
The court supported this determination by relying on the Attorney
General's grant of plenary power under 28 U.S.C. section 516.78 In
addition, the court cited the Supreme Court's opinion in United
States v. Republic Steel Corp. 79 for the proposition that "the Attorney
General may file suit on behalf of the United States without specific
statutory authority whenever the United States has a justiciable in-
terest."80 The court, thus, held that the Attorney General can prop-
erly seek an injunction on behalf of the United States because of
her broad authority to litigate and IGRA's indefinite language con-
cerning the enforcement of closure orders. 81
74. See id. at 561. The government relied on the Attorney's General broad
authority to litigate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1994). See id. The Tribe con-
tended that nothing in the IGRA or Section 516 authorized the Attorney General
to enforce closure orders issued by the NIGC. See id. at 562.
75. See id. For the text of the IGRA's provision authorizing the issuance of
permanent closure orders, see supra note 39.
76. Santee, 135 F.3d at 562.
77. See id.
78. See id. (referring to Eighth Circuit's ruling in U.S. v. Hercules, Inc.). In
Hercules, the court found that 28 U.S.C. § 516 allowed the Attorney General to
settle cost recovery actions under CERCLA since the United States was involved
and Congress did not specially authorize the EPA to proceed without supervision.
See United States v. Hercules, Inc., 961 F.2d 796, 798-800 (8th Cir. 1992); see also
Federal Trade Commission v. Guignon, 390 F.2d 323, 323 (8th Cir. 1968).
79. 362 U.S. 482 (1960).
80. Santee, 135 F.3d at 562. In Republic Stee4 the Supreme Court upheld the
Attorney General's authority to seek injunctive relief, even though the statute
which formed the basis for his suit (The Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of
1899) did not give specific authority to do so. See Republic Stee4 362 U.S. at 492.
The test to determine if such authority existed "was whether the United States had
an interest to protect or defend." Id.
81. See Santee, 135 F.3d at 562 (stating "IGRA's silence on the matter of en-
forcement of the Chairman's closure order compels our conclusion that the broad
authority to litigate granted to the Attorney General under 28 U.S.C. § 516 envi-
sions the action taken here by the United States Attorney to enforce on behalf of
11
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B. United States' Right to Seek an Injunction
After the court determined that the Attorney General could
properly initiate the suit against the Tribe, it considered whether
the government could seek injunctive relief to enforce the closure
order.8 2 First, the court reversed the district court's decision to
deny civil injunctive relief.88 The court asserted that section
2713(a) of IGRA "authorized [the Chairman] to assess fines for the
violation of IGRA itself, not for violations of closure orders entered
under the auspices of IGRA."8 4 Additionally, the court reviewed
regulations passed by the NIGC, noting that closure orders were
covered in the section entitled "enforcement," while civil fines were
addressed in their own self-titled section.8 5 It found that the civil
fines section of the regulations did not include non-compliance to
closure orders as a grounds for fining a tribe.86 Based on the
court's reading of IGRA and the Commission's regulations, it con-
cluded that the district court erred in its refusal to grant an injunc-
tion to enforce a closure order.8 7
C. Enjoining a Crime
After the court determined that IGRA allowed the Attorney
General to seek an injunction to enforce the NIGC's closure order,
it considered whether an injunction was proper under the facts of
the NIGC and the United States as an interested party, the Chairman's order de-
manding that the Tribe close its gaming facility.")
82. See id at 563.
83. See id. The district court concluded that the Chairman's imposition of
fines under 25 U.S.C. § 2713(a), not civil injunctions, was the only civil remedy
available and that IGRA only empowered the government to seek criminal prose-
cution. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 9-10 (July 10,1996).
84. Santee, 135 F.2d at 563. Section 2713 of IGRA, titled "Civil penalties,"
states in pertinent part:
(a) Authority; amount appeal; written complaint
(1) Subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by the Commis-
sion, the Chairman shall have the authority to levy and collect appropri-
ate civil fines, not o exceed $25,000 per violation, against the tribal
operator of an Indian game or management contractor engaged in gam-
ing for any violation of any provision of this chapter, or any violation of
any regulation by the Commission pursuant to this chapter ....
(b) Temporary closure; hearing
(1) The Chairman shall have power to order temporary closure of
an Indian game for substantial violation of the provisions of this chapter,
of regulation prescribed by the Commission pursuant to this chapter ....
25 U.S.C. § 2713.
85. See Santee, 135 F.2d at 563 (referring to 25 C.F.R. pt. 573 & 575).
86. See id. (referring to 25 C.F.R. pt. 575.4).
87. See id.
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the case.88 Two sub-issues had to be resolved before it could rule
on this main issue: 1) did the Tribe violate Nebraska law; and 2)
can the court issue an injunction to prevent a crime?
1. Does the Operation of Video Gambling Devices Violate Nebraska
Law?
First, the court held that the Tribe operated an illegal gaming
facility since Nebraska law prohibits the use of video slot machines,
poker and blackjack.89 The court distinguished Nebraska's accept-
ance of the Selective Lottery Output Terminal System ("SLOTS") to
display keno results in a traditional slot machine. 90 The court
stated that, "[t]he 'SLOTS' device is only a means of allowing keno
players to review keno results, and, unlike a slot machine, is not a
means of conducting the game itself."91
2. Can the Court Enjoin the Commission of a Crime?
Second, the court decided that the lower court erred by not
granting an injunction, based on the general rule that a court may
not enjoin the commission of a crime. 92 To reach this conclusion,
the court initially determined that IGRA incorporated state civil
and criminal law.93 The court relied on the Rules of Decision Act94
and the Supreme Court's ruling that judicial decisions are a part of
a state's laws in accordance with the Rules of Decision Act.95 The
court then noted that Nebraska civil case law permitted injunctive
88. See id.
89. See id. at 564; see also, State ex rel. Spire v. Strawberries, Inc., 473 N.W.2d
428 (1991) (finding defendant, who placed video poker, blackjack, and craps ma-
chines in his taverns, guilty of possession of "gambling devices" under Nebraska
Revised Statutes § 28-1101); Nebraska Revised Statutes § 28-1101 (prohibiting use
of "video gaming device which has the capability of awarding something of value").
90. See Santee, 135 F.3d at 564. The Tribe argued that Nebraska condoned
video gambling by approving the use of SLOTS machines. See id.
91. Id. (citing Opinion of Nebraska Attorney General at 11 (Sept. 18, 1995)).
92. See id. at 565. The court acknowledged the maxim that "equity generally
will not enjoin the commission of a crime ... [except]: 1) in cases of national
emergency; 2) in cases of widespread public nuisance; and 3) in cases where a
statute grants a court the power to enjoin a crime." Id. (referring to 11A CHARLEs
A. . S . ET A-., FEDERAlT PRACTICE AND PROCDURE § 2942, at 70-74).
93. See Santee, 135 F.3d at 565. The court viewed the phrase -all State laws
pertaining to the licensing, regulation, or prohibition of gambling" contained in
18 U.S.C. § 1166(a) to include State case law as well as State criminal law. See id&;
see supra note 4 and accompanying text for further information on §1166(a).
94. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994) (stating "laws of the several states . . . shall be
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States in
cases where they apply").
95. See Santee, 135 F.3d at 565 (referring to Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch,
387 U.S. 456, 464 (1967)).
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relief to force the closure of gambling facilities determined to be
public nuisances. 96 In making this determination, Nebraska courts
viewed "continuing and flagrant" violations as the key factor.97 Be-
cause the Tribe reopened its gambling facility in spite of the
NIGC's closure order, the court determined that the Tribe's actions
were "continuing and flagrant," and therefore, subject to
injunction. 98
D. Constitutionality of IGRA's Tribal-State Compact Provisions
Finally, in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Seminole Tribe,
the Tribe challenged the constitutionality of IGRA's provisions con-
cerning tribal-state compacting. 99 The court declined to address
this issue based on its prior holdings.100 The court reasoned that,
since Class III gaming was illegal in Nebraska, IGRA imposed no
duty on Nebraska to negotiate with the Tribe to allow for class III
gaming on Tribal land. 101
V. CRiricAL ANALYsIS
A. Attorney General's Right to Maintain Closure Order
The Santee court failed to adequately justify its holding that the
Attorney General possessed the authority to maintain the NIGC clo-
sure order. This holding must be examined in light of the follow-
ing: (1) analysis of the cases cited by the court; (2) critique of the
court's statutory basis; and (3) examination of related case law that
the court did not include in its opinion.
1. Cited Cases
First, the two cases that the court relied upon, United States v.
Hercules, Inc.10 2 and United States v. Republic Steel Corp.,1°3 are distin-
guishable from the facts in Santee. In Hercules, the defendants chal-
96. See id. See generally State ex. rel. Spire v. Strawberries, Inc., 473 N.W.2d
473, 435 (1991) (citing cases in which gambling facilities had been determined to
be public nuisances).
97. See Strawberries, 473 N.W.2d at 436.
98. See Santee, 135 F.3d at 565.
99. See id. (noting Tribe's argument that Congress was not able to authorize
lawsuits against States for failure to negotiate in "good faith").
100. See id. The Eighth Circuit relied on its prior ruling in Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, which stated, "[the 'such gaming' language of 25
U.S.C. § 2710(d) (1) (B) does not require the state to negotiate with respect to
forms of gaming it does not presently permit." 3 F.3d 273, 279 (8th Cir. 1993).
101. See Santee, 135 F.3d at 566.
102. 961 F.2d 796 (8th Cir. 1992).
103. 362 U.S. 482 (1960).
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lenged the Attorney General's right to enter into consent decrees
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act (CERCLA).1 04 The defendants did not ques-
tion the Attorney General's right to initiate the suit because he
properly did so under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA), 10 5 the Clean Water Act,10 6 the Refuse Act, 10 7 the Federal
Priority Statute, 08 CERCLA, 109 and Arkansas law. 110
In Santee, the Attorney General sought to enforce a mandate of
the NIGC. The court stated that "IGRA [does not] address specifi-
cally the Attorney General's authority to institute judicial proceed-
ings on behalf of [either] the Chairman or the NIGC to enforce
closure orders .... "111 Thus, the court improperly relied on Hercu-
les because the issue in Santee was whether the Attorney General had
the authority to initiate a suit, while the issue in Hercules concerned
the limitations on the Attorney General's authority.
In Republic Steel, the Supreme Court considered whether the
Attorney General could seek an injunction without the requisite
statutory authority.112 At first blush, this case seems on point with
Santee, however, two key differences exist. First, in Republic Steel, the
Court found that the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of
1899 specifically granted the Attorney General the right to initiate
104. See Hercules, 961 F.2d at 798 (challenging consent decree entered into by
United States and Hercules' co-defendants on grounds that CERCLA only autho-
rizes head of Environmental Protection Agency to enter into such agreements).
The court concluded that "CERCLA § 122 does not clearly and unambiguously
limit the Attorney General's plenary authority over the control and conduct of
litigation in which the United States is a party." Id. Therefore, the court upheld
the consent decree under the Attorney General's plenary power. See id. at 800.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1998).
106. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1998).
107. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1998).
108. 31 U.S.C. § 3731 (1998).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1998).
110. See United States v. Hercules, 961 F.2d 796, 798 (8th Cir. 1992). The
government filed suit against Hercules under RCRA, the Clean Water Act, the Re-
fuse Act, and Arkansas law. See id. The CERCLA suit, which was the subject of the
litigation, involved the liability of Phoenix Capital Enterprises, Inc., InterCapital
Industries, Inc., Inter-Ag Corporation, C.P. Bomar, Jr., andJ. Randal Tomblin (col-
lectively referred to as the "Phoenix parties") See id. at 797-98.
111. Santee, 135 F.3d at 562. In fact, no where in the IGRA did Congress ad-
dress (specifically or impliedly) who may institute judicial proceedings to enforce
closure orders. See id.
112. See United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 492 (1960). Re-
public Steel operated a steel mill on the banks of the Calumet River and dumped
solid waste into the river. See id. at 483. This activity seriously threatened the 21-
foot depth necessary to maintain the river's viability. See id. at 484. In order to
restore the river to its proper depth, the United States sought to enjoin Republic
Steel from further dumping. See id. at 483.
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the suit.113 In comparison, the IGRA contains no such provision.1 14
Second, the Court examined the United States' interest served by
the injunction.115 The Eighth Circuit, in Santee, failed to state any
federal interest that an injunction would serve. If the court used
legislative intent to determine an interest, as the Supreme Court
did in Republic Steel, one could argue that the Tribe's right to eco-
nomic development and self-sufficiency under the IGRA is as im-
portant as the government's right to prevent unauthorized
gambling.116
2. Statutory Support
In addition to case law, the Eighth Circuit's analysis relied on
statutory interpretation. The court's cursory review of IGRA re-
vealed only that the statute did not "specifically" grant the Attorney
General, the Commissioner or the NIGC independent authority to
litigate the agency's decisions. 117 The court should have consid-
ered the statute as a whole. 118 Section 2713 of IGRA, entitled "Civil
Penalties," vests authority to levy and collect fines and issue closure
orders in the Chairman and the Commission. 119 Nowhere in this
section does the language mention the Attorney General, much less
indicate that the Attorney General can pursue civil remedies. The
only relevant sections which mention the Attorney General are Sec-
113. See id. 485 (1960) (stating "Section 17, 33 U.S.C.A. § 413, directs the De-
partment of Justice to 'conduct the legal proceedings necessary to enforce' the
provisions of the Act"). The issue was whether the Rivers and Harbors Act author-
ized the Attorney General to seek injunctive relief, absent specific statutory lan-
guage to that effect. See id. at 491-92.
114. For a discussion of the IGRA's lack of statutory authorization, see supra
note 88 and accompanying text.
115. See Republic Steel, 362 U.S. at 492 (noting United States' interest in restor-
ing navigability of Calumet River). The Court based its determination on the legis-
lative intent behind the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899. See id.
116. See supra note 7 and accompanying text for discussion of the legislative
intent behind the IGRA.
117. See Santee, 135 F.3d 558, 562 (8th Cir. 1998) (determining that Chairman
could issue temporary closure orders; NIGC could make closure order permanent;
and Tribe could appeal permanent order to district court). See supra notes 39 and
49 and accompanying text for further discussion of these provisions.
118. See United States v. Hercules, Inc., 961 F.2d 796, 799 (8th Cir. 1992)
(reviewing CERCLA § 122 as whole to determine whether it limited Attorney Gen-
eral's right to enter into consent agreement).
119. See 25 U.S.C. § 2713 (stating that "the Chairman shall have authority to
levy and collect appropriate civil fines" and "the Commission shall . . .decide
whether to order a permanent closure of the gaming operation"). For a further
discussion of this section, see also supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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tions 2716120 and 1166.121 These sections merely grant the Attor-
ney General the right to prosecute criminal violations. By
extending this right to civil actions, without legislative authoriza-
tion, the court arguably usurped the legislative function.
The court also referred to the Attorney General's grant of ple-
nary power to litigate under Title 18 of the United States Code Sec-
tion 516.122 The court stated that the key question in determining
if the Attorney General could bring suit was "whether the United
States had an interest to protect or defend."123 The court failed,
however, to answer this question. Furthermore, the court ignored
the Fourth Circuit's ruling in United States v. Solomon, which stated
that Section 516 "is merely a housekeeping provision."' 24 Solomon
established that, in the absence of a statutory right to file suit, the
government must establish that it has both implicit authority and
an interest in the particular case. 125
Under this reasoning, the case would have to be one in which
the United States has implicit authority because IGRA does not ex-
pressly grant the Attorney General the right to enforce a perma-
nent closure order. The government could have asserted this
120. 25 U.S.C. § 2716(c) (stating "[t]he Attorney General shall investigate ac-
tivities associated with gaming authorized by this chapter which may be a violation
of Federal law").
121. 18 U.S.C. § 1166(d) (providing that "[t]he United States shall have ex-
clusive jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions of violations of State gambling laws
122. See Santee, 135 F.3d at 561-62 (noting that 18 U.S.C. § 516 states,
"[e]xcept as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation in which the
United States, an agency, or officer there is party, or is interested.., is reserved to
officers of the Department of Justice, under the discretion of the Attorney
General").
123. Id. at 562 (citing United States v. Republic Steel, 362 U.S. 482, 492
(1960)).
124. United States v. Solomon, 563 F.2d 1121, 1124 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing
United States v. Daniel, Urbahn, Seelyle and Fuller, 357 F. Supp. 853, 857-58 (N.D.
Ill. 1973). In Solomon, the United States attempted to assert the constitutional
rights of mentally retarded patients against the administrators of a Maryland
mental institution under 28 U.S.C. § 516. See id. at 1123-24. The Attorney General
claimed that the United Sates had an interest in the rights of the mentally retarded
as provided by the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, P.L.
94-103, 89 Stat. 486, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6012 (1977) and other federal statutes. See
id. at 1123. The Fourth Circuit considered this a legitimate interest, but con-
cluded that the Attorney General lacked standing because of the absence of ex-
plicit and/or implicit statutory authority. See id. at 1129.
125. See id. at 1126. The court noted that the traditional cases in which the
United States has authority to file suit are those involving interstate commerce,
public nuisance, and national emergency. See Solomon, 563 F.2d at 1129.
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interest because Santee involved gambling, an activity that affects in-
terstate commerce and may constitute a public nuisance.1 26
3. Related Cases
The Eighth Circuit properly began its analysis with the relevant
statutes and examination of Hercules and Republic Steel It failed,
however, to examine other pertinent cases, including United States v.
Pima County Community College District12 7 and United States v. St. Regis
Paper Company.128 Pima is relevant because the district court held
that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of i964 gave the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission the exclusive authority to file suit in
an effort "to eliminate duplication of effort, the over-lapping of au-
thority and to standardize procedures.' 2 9
In the present case, IGRA grants the NIGC the right to issue
permanent closure orders and to conduct investigations. 130 The
statute only grants the Attorney General the right to investigate vio-
lations of federal laws.' 3' Since the litigator seeks an injunction
based on the closure order, it is logical that the Commission should
initiate a suit brought under IGRA.
Consistent with this reasoning, the Second Circuit in St. Regis
denied the Attorney General the right to enforce a Federal Trade
Commission's (FTC) cease and desist order.132 The court focused
126. See State ex rel. Spire v. Strawberries, 473 N.W.2d 428, 428 (Neb. 1991)
(holding gambling-related activities can constitute public nuisance); City of
Omaha v. Danner, 185 N.W.2d 869, 869 (Neb. 1971) (finding establishment which
conducted various activities, including gambling, was public nuisance); State ex
rel. Johnson v. Hash, 13 N.W.2d 716, 716 (Neb. 1944) (holding facilities that offer
continuous gambling are public nuisances).
127. 409 F. Supp. 1061 (D. Ariz. 1976).
128. 355 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1966).
129. Pima, 409 F. Supp. at 1063. The Attorney General attempted to initiate
the suit by asserting that Title VII granted him the right to file, pattern and prac-
tice suits against public sector employers. See id. The court refused to read such
language into the statute. See id.
130. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2713, 2715. For a further discussion of Commission's
right to issue permanent closure orders, see supra notes 96 and 40 and accompany-
ing texts.
131. See supra note 120 (discussing Attorney General's right to investigate
gambling violations under 25 U.S.C. § 2716(c)).
132. See St. Regis, 355 F.2d at 699-700 (holding that "Congress intended sec-
tion 16 of the FTCA to be jurisdictional, not directory, and that its requirements
must be satisfied by the FTC prior to the commencement of a civil penalty suit by
the Attorney General"). The Attorney General sought to recover civil penalties
under § 5(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act for St. Regis Paper Co.'s viola-
tion of a cease and desist order. See id. at 690. Section 5(1) states in pertinent part:
Any person, partnership, or corporation who violates an order of the
Commission to cease and desist after it has become final, and while such
order is in effect, shall forfeit and pay to the United States a civil penalty
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on the fact that the case was a civil suit and that the FTC had the
primary responsibility of issuing and interpreting cease and desist
orders.13 3 This fact pattern also existed in Santee. The Attorney
General's enforcement of the NIGC's permanent closure order,
like the Attorney General's attempt to enforce an FTC cease and
desist order, constituted a civil action, seeking a civil remedy. 134
Moreover, IGRA gives the NIGC and its Chairman the right to in-
vestigate possible violations of the statute and then to issue closure
orders. 135 Accordingly, if the court accepts the Second Circuit's
reasoning in St. Regis, the Commission, rather than the Attorney
General, should initiate the suit.
B. Government's Right to Civil Injunctive Relief
Two flaws exist with respect to the Eighth Circuit's award of an
injunction as a proper enforcement mechanism for closure orders.
First, although the court noted that Section 575.4 of the NIGC reg-
ulations addresses when civil fines will be assessed, it failed to note
that Section 575.3 of the regulations addresses how fines will be as-
sessed.1 36 By so doing, the court focused on the timing of fines and
ignored that closure orders factor into the assessment of the
of not more than $5,000 for each violation, which shall accrue to the
United States and may be recovered in a civil action brought by the
United States.
15 U.S.C. § 45(1).
133. See id. at 691, 694 (expressing concern over extent of Attorney General's
authority to prosecute violations of FI'C orders to cease and desist). The court
stated:
While it is reasonable to presume that when Congress enacts a criminal
statute it intends to authorize the Attorney General to enforce the statute
on his own motion, i.e., public policy favors the unencumbered enforce-
ment of criminal laws, but no such presumption of public policy operates
here where the authority of the Attorney General to punish violations of
FTC cease and desist orders is at issue.
Id. at 693. Furthermore, the court stated:
[T]he Attorney General has no staff of experts continually checking on
compliance with FTC orders. Since he has no authority to enforce the
FTCA and has no influence or role to play in the formulation of cease
and desist orders issued thereunder, his office is simply not equipped or
designed to intelligently police the Commission's orders or to develop
and maintain a broad consistent, policy in this area. [footnote omitted]
Id. at 697.
134. See supra note 22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Attorney
General's actions.
135. See supra note 16 and accompanying text for a discussion of the NIGC's
and the Chairman's powers.
136. See Santee, 135 F.3d at 563 (stating that "section 575.4 of the NIGC regu-
lations addresses when civil fines will be assessed and does not include the imposi-
tion of fines for non-compliance with the Chairman's closure orders").
Furthermore, Section 575.3 states:
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amount of the fine.1 7 Therefore, when considered as a whole, the
NIGC's regulations support the district court's ruling that fines are
the only available civil remedies.13 8
Second, neither IGRA nor the NIGC regulations mention in-
junctions as an enforcement mechanism for violations of closure
orders. The statute only authorizes fines and closure orders.1 9
Since the operative statute does not authorize injunctions, the
court should not have granted such relief.' 40
C. Government's Right to Enjoin Crime
The Eighth Circuit's conclusion that the Tribe illegally oper-
ated a gaming facility had sufficient statutory and case law sup-
port.141 Even so, the court should have explored the Tribe's
argument that Nebraska approved video gaming devices when it ap-
proved the use of Selective Lottery Output Terminal System
(SLOTS).142 When confronted with a similar issue, the Tenth Cir-
cuit, in Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma v. Green,143
held that video lottery terminals constituted "gambling devices." 144
The Potawatomi court identified two essential elements in de-
fining "gambling device:" "(1) the device must be a machine or
mechanical device designed primarily for gambling purposes; and
The Chairman shall review each notice of violation and order of temporary
closure in accordance with § 575.4 of this part to determine whether a civil
fine will be assessed, the amount of the fine, and, in the case of continuing
violations, whether each daily illegal act or omission will be deemed a sep-
arate violation for purposes of the total civil fine assessed.
25 C.F.R. § 575.3 (emphasis added).
137. See supra notes 63 and 113 for a further discussion.
138. See Santee, 135 F.3d at 563 (recounting district court's conclusion that
any civil remedy, outside of statutory authorized fine, was prohibited under provi-
sion of IGRA).
139. See 25 U.S.C. § 2713; supra note 40 and accompanying text.
140. See United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 507 (1960)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (stating, "where, as in this statute, Congress has pro-
vided a detailed and limited scheme of remedies, it seems to me the Court is pre-
cluded from drawing on any source outside the Act").
141. See supra note 66 for a discussion of Nebraska's prohibition against
video gambling.
142. See Santee, 135 F.3d at 564 (concluding that "'SLOTS' device is only a
means of allowing keno players to view keno results ... not a means of conducting
the game itself"); see also supra notes 67 and 68 and accompanying text for explana-
tion of "SLOTS" and court's distinction between it and other gambling devices.
143. 995 F.2d 179 (10th Cir. 1993).
144. Id. at 180-81 (concerning Tribe's importation of gambling mechanisms
against Oklahoma law). In Potawatomi, the Tribe sought declaratory judgement
declaring the importation of video lottery terminal ("VLTs") legal, even though
Oklahoma law and the Johnson Act prohibited the dealing of gambling devices.
See id. at 180.
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(2) the device must operate so that a person may receive or become
entitled to receive, as the result of the application of an element of
chance, money or property."1 45 Nebraska statutes similarly define
"gambling device."' 46
Applying the Tenth Circuit's test, the SLOTS machines may be
classified as gambling devices since they are designed primarily for
gambling purposes (i.e., to display keno results) and they are used
by keno players to determine if they are entitled to money as a re-
sult of their purchasing a keno ticket. Under this approach, the
Tribe's operation of video poker, blackjack and slot machines
would continue to be illegal under Nebraska law; however, the
court would be required to find Nebraska's approach to video gam-
ing regulatory, not prohibitory. 147 Although this conclusion bears
little significance to the present issue, it greatly affects the Eighth
Circuit ruling on the constitutionality issue.
D. Constitutionality of IGRA's Tribal-State Compact Provisions
The Eighth Circuit declined to address the constitutionality of
the IGRA's tribal-state compact provisions because Nebraska law
prohibited video gambling. Under the court's reasoning, IGRA did
not require the State to negotiate at all about prohibited activi-
ties.148 The court could not maintain this position if it accepted the
SLOTS hypothesis that Nebraska law did not prohibit video gam-
145. Id. at 181 (clarifying definition of gambling device under the Johnson
Act, 15 U.s.C. § 1175). The court concluded that Oklahoma's definition did not
materially differ and since the state prohibited the use of all gambling devices,
including VLTs, the IGRA prohibited the Tribe from importing such devices. See
id.
146. Neb.Rev.St. § 28-1101 (5) (stating that "[g] ambling device shall mean any
device, machine.., or equipment that is used or usable for engaging in gambling,
whether that activity consists of gambling between persons or gambling by a per-
son involving the playing of a machine"); see also State v. Two IGT Video Poker
Games, 465 N.W.2d 453, 458 (Neb. 1991) (defining "gambling device" as device
used or usable to bet something of value on outcome of future event, which out-
come is determined by element of chance).
147. See Potawatomi, 995 F.2d at 181 (concluding importation of "VLTs" vio-
lated state law aginst mp.rtd-tio of gambling devices): United States v. Cabazon
Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 210, 211 (1987) (stating, "[i]n light of the fact
that California permits a substantial amount of gambling activity ... and actually
promotes gambling through state lottery, we must conclude that California regu-
lates gambling in general . . ."); see also Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. State of
Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024, 1031 (2nd Cir. 1990) (holding that since Connecticut
permitted "Las Vegas Nights" by non-profit organizations, state's approach to class
III gaming was regulatory, not prohibitory).
148. See Santee, 135 F.3d at 565 (citing Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South
Dakota, 3 F.3d 273).
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ing, but merely regulated it.149 Under this alternative reasoning,
the court would have to determine whether the compacting provi-
sions are severable from the rest of IGRA; and if so, what impact
severing those provisions would have in the present case. 150 Most
likely, the court would refuse to enforce the injunction. 151
VI. IMPACT
Once the Supreme Court removed the right of Indian Tribes
to file suit against a state that fails to negotiate in good faith, the
scales tipped heavily in favor of the states. 152 From the legislative
history and overall statutory scheme of IGRA, it seems clear that
Congress did not intend this result. Thus, Congress should revisit
the issues underlying IGRA and make a new attempt to balance
state sovereignty with the economic importance of gaming to In-
dian tribes. 15 3
Santee represents one court's attempt to resolve the crucial is-
sues concerning Indian gaming. Although the Eighth Circuit's con-
clusions are reasonable, they are not beyond critique. The
economic and sociological importance of Indian gaming issues re-
quires resolution that will be both equitable and definitive. Thus,
the courts are not the appropriate forum. Rather, only careful con-
sideration and action by Congress can ensure appropriate resolu-
tion of these issues.
Russell Lannutti
149. For a full discussion of the "SLOTS" hypothesis, see supra notes 141-47,
and accompanying text.
150. For a complete discussion of severability and post Seminole decisions, see
supra note 51-56 and accompanying text.
151. See United States v. Spokane Tribe of Indians, 139 F.3d 1297, 1297 (9th
Cir. 1998) (holding that portions of IGRA still in effect after Seminole Tribe cannot
form basis for injunction). The Ninth Circuit in Spokane stated:
It is quite clear from the structure of [the IGRA] that the tribe's right to
sue the state is a key part of a carefully-crafted scheme balancing the in-
terests of the tribes and the states. It therefore seems highly unlikely that
Congress would have passed one part without the other, leaving the tribes
essentially powerless.
Id. at 1300.
152. See id. (referring to Supreme Court's decision in Seminole Tribe).
153. See Sullivan, supra note 50, at 1157-66 (chronicling desires and attempts
to amend IGRA). The article refers to the discontent expressed by governors,
tribes, and members of Congress over the present provisions of the IGRA. See id.
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